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Fiscal policy efficiency and coordination: The New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics Approach 
 






The paper offers a survey of recent research on fiscal policy in both deterministic and 
stochastic models of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) initiated by Obstfeld 
and  Rogoff  (1995,  2002b).  The  survey  includes  a  comparison  of  the  implications  of  the 
deterministic  benchmark  model  to  the  empirical  evidence  obtained  in  recent  studies.  It 
provides a detailed discussion of the recent extensions induced by the gap between theoretical 
and empirical implications. These extensions revise the traditionally studied aspects of fiscal 
issues  such  as  the  transmission  channels  of  fiscal  policy  by  introducing  production 
specialization at the international level or by diversifying the pricing decisions of firms. They 
also  cover  current  economic  issues  such  as  the  effect  of  financial  globalization  on  fiscal 
policy efficiency and the implication of a reduction in public employment in order to cut 
taxes.  
After presenting the basic features of a benchmark stochastic NOEM model for fiscal 
policy, the paper discusses the recent developments the gains from international fiscal policy 
cooperation with respect to gains from fiscal stabilization. 
 
Keywords: New Open Economy Macroeconomics, fiscal policy, stochastic and 
deterministic general equilibrium models 
JEL classification: E62, E63, F41, F42   2 
Résumé 
L’article  propose  une  revue  de  la  littérature  sur  la  politique  budgétaire  qui  s’est 
développée  dans  le  cadre  des  modèles  déterministes  et  stochastiques  de  la  nouvelle 
macroéconomie internationale à la suite des apports de Obstfeld et Rogoff (1995, 2002b). Il 
compare les résultats obtenus dans le modèle déterministe de référence à ce obtenus dans les 
travaux empiriques récents. Il fournit une discussion détaillée des extensions récentes de ce 
modèle  suscitées  par  la  différences  de  ces  résultats.  Ces  extensions  reconsidère  l’analyse 
traditionnel  de  la  politique  budgétaire,  notamment  celle  qui  porte  sur  le  mécanisme  de 
transmission internationale de cette politique en introduisant la spécialisation internationale de 
la production ou en tenant compte de différentes modalités de prise de décision en matière de 
prix. Elles analysent également les implications de phénomènes récents, comme celles de la 
globalisation financière sur la politique budgétaire et celle d’une réduction de l’emploi dans le 
secteur public qui doit permettre de réduire la pression fiscale.  
Apres avoir présenter les caractéristiques essentiels d’un modèle stochastique de référence 
de la nouvelle macroéconomie internationale, cet article discute les prolongements récents de 
cette approche ainsi que les gains résultants d’une coopération budgétaire internationale et 
ceux provenant d’une politique de stabilisation budgétaire. 
 
Mots-clés :  nouvelle  macroéconomie  internationale,  politique  budgétaire,  modèles 
déterministes et stochastiques d’équilibre général  
Classification JEL : E62, E63, F41, F42   3 
 
1 Introduction 
After  a  period  of  neglect  since  the  70s,  fiscal  policy  has  regained  attention  recently. 
Several  current  events  can  explain  this  recovery  of  interest.  First,  higher public  debt  and 
increasing budget deficits experienced in most of the developed countries have called for 
significant fiscal reactions. These reactions, due to a lack of coordination, exerted undesired 
effects in the neighbor countries. Second, the co movement of public and current account 
deficits in some countries such as the US suggested a possible causality between the two 
phenomena, justifying restrictive fiscal policy in order to reduce trade imbalances. Finally, 
fiscal policy turned out to be especially indispensable when monetary policy is not available 
or inefficient. Indeed, fiscal policy is the only instrument to stimulate economic activity when 
monetary policy is inefficient because of a nearly zero level of interest rates as in the case of 
Japan, or when monetary policy is not available as in the case of European countries which 
delegated monetary policy to the supranational European Central Bank (ECB). 
Because of their lack of microeconomic foundations, the traditional models of Mundell 
Fleming do not allow to consider these issues in a detailed way. Similarly, the models of the 
80s which adopt an intertemporal approach fail to offer a realistic view of fiscal policy issues 
since they neglect market imperfections and the empirically observed price and wage rigidity. 
The new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) framework, initiated by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995, 1996) (O R hereafter), offers a renewal of the macroeconomic policy analysis 
by building a bridge between the two preceding approaches. Indeed, while assuming short run 
price rigidity as in Mundell Fleming models, NOEM adopts the intertemporal approach of the 
flexible price models through optimizing behavior of agents under imperfect competition in 
order to consider the international transmission mechanism of macroeconomic policy. The 
microeconomic foundations of NOEM help improve the analysis of fiscal policy transmission 
channels and allow for a welfare based evaluation of fiscal policy efficiency instead of social 
loss functions generally postulated in traditional models. 
O R  (1995) puts  light  on  the  role  of  these  new  features  in  analyzing  macroeconomic 
policy in a two country framework. They analyze the effects of discretionary policy under 
flexible  exchange  rates  and  integrated  financial  markets  in  a  setup  where  ricardian 
equivalence holds. With this benchmark framework, they provide a starting point for future 
research in policy analysis in open economies. In this context, fiscal expansion is beggar 
thyself and prosper thy neighbor. Moreover, fiscal expansion may cause a trade deficit or 
surplus depending on whether the expansion is temporary or permanent. In contrast to the   4 
Dornbusch model, fiscal policy does not lead to an over/undershooting of the exchange rate. 
O R (1995) also find that fiscal expansion reduces consumption and hence welfare in the 
implementing country. 
Some of these results are in contrast with those obtained in empirical analyses. The over 
simplified structure of the theoretical model was considered as one of the reasons to this 
difference in results. Indeed, the benchmark model limits the definition of fiscal policy to 
goods purchases and neglects much of the empirical reality.  Therefore, efforts have been 
made to render the setup more realistic by introducing empirical facts such as the imperfect 
pass through of exchange rates and production specialization at the international level, among 
others. 
Other authors attempted to extend the setup to shed light on current economic issues. 
Indeed, the formation of European Union gave way to the analysis of fiscal policy in NOEM 
under fixed exchange rates and in a currency union setup. Similarly, the recent enhancement 
of financial market integration at the international level stimulated research regarding the 
impact of such integration on fiscal policy efficiency. Finally, the twin deficit problem in the 
US induced extensions of the benchmark model that study the relation between trade balance 
and public deficit. 
O R (2000, 2002b) extend O R (1995) to a stochastic environment which gives a second 
impulse to the analysis of macroeconomic policy in NOEM framework. The authors use this 
setup to analyze gains from stabilization and from international coordination of monetary 
policy.  Their  results  are  similar  to  those  of  traditional  models:  gains  from  monetary 
cooperation are negligible, a result that can explain the divergence between the Fed’s and 
ECB’s monetary policies. Some of the following work introduced fiscal policy in this setup to 
evaluate the gains from fiscal policy coordination and to see if the availability of fiscal policy 
can modify the pessimistic results of O R on the coordination of monetary policies. Fiscal 
policy is generally introduced through contingent fiscal rules, which can be interpreted as 
automatic stabilizers. 
The present paper offers a survey of the NOEM litterature which has grown rapidly in 
recent years focusing on the fiscal issues stated above. First, the paper aims to produce a 
complete up to date inventory of deterministic NOEM models. Our survey is larger than that 
of Ganelli and Lane (2003) who devote a section to the discussion of the early contributions 
in their presentation of dynamic general equilibrium models. It is also larger than that of 
Coutinho (2005) who reconsiders these early extensions of deterministic NOEM model. The 
present survey compares the implications of the benchmark model as well as those of its early   5 
extensions to the empirical evidence obtained in recent studies. The gap between theoretical 
and empirical implications led to further development of the benchmark model, which the 
survey discusses in detail. It also discusses the recent extensions concerning current economic 
issues such as the effect of imperfect financial integration on fiscal policy efficiency and the 
implications of alternative structures of public spending. In addition, it considers the effect of 
a cash in–advance constraint for money demand which is particularly suited to fiscal policy 
analysis. Second, the paper discusses the stochastic NOEM models which allow to analyse the 
stabilization capacity and the international coordination of fiscal policy. Again, our discussion 
covers a wider range of issues than Coutinho (2005) who makes a first effort to discuss fiscal 
policy in the stochastic NOEM setup at a time when research on the subject is yet limited. The 
recent  development  of  the  research  on  the  stabilization  role  of  fiscal  policy  in  a  NOEM 
framework  allows  us  to  present  the  basic  features  of  a  benchmark  model  in  contrast  to 
Coutinho (2005). 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic deterministic setup of O R 
(1995) adapted to fiscal policy analysis and discusses the assumptions that are later relaxed in 
the research that followed. Section 3 analyzes the implications of fiscal policy in deterministic 
NOEM models. Section 4 discusses the work that extends O R  (1995) to the  analysis of 
current economic issues. Section 5 presents the stochastic framework adapted to fiscal policy 
analysis and reviews the research on fiscal stabilization and gains from fiscal cooperation in a 
stochastic NOEM framework as well as monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2  The  Benchmark  Model  for  Fiscal  Policy  Analysis  and  the  Deterministic  NOEM 
Framework 
The general equilibrium framework of O R (1995, 1996) constitutes the benchmark setup 
of deterministic NOEM models. Much of the assumptions of this benchmark model are later 
relaxed by others. 
The model describes two identical interdependent economies, called Home and Foreign, 
with imperfect competition in goods markets. The world population is normalized to one. 
Households indexed on the interval [0, n] reside in the home country while the residents of the 
foreign country are indexed on the interval (n, 1]. Each of these infinitely lived households 
with perfect foresight produces a single differentiated good z and consumes a basket of all 
available home and foreign goods. 
   6 
2.1 Household Preferences 
In  the  benchmark  model,  households  in  both  countries  have  similar  preferences. 
Furthermore,  the  consumer producer  households  in  each  country  are  identical.  The 

























C U χ β where  0 , > Κ χ  and 0 1 < < β     (1) 
The above equation, where  β  is the discount factor, states that utility in period t depends 
positively on the log value of the agent’s consumption 
j
t C  and real balances  t
j
t P M  and 
negatively on the agent’s production 
j
t y  which measures his labor effort. The overall price 
index is denoted by  t P.  
The fact that consumption enters logarithmically in the utility function implies that the 
intertemporal consumption elasticity is equal to one. The assumption of unit consumption 
substitution elasticity which is retained in most of the NOEM models for simplicity is relaxed 
in Tille (1999) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). 
Most of the NOEM models introduce money in the utility function either in a logarithmic 
or non logarithmic way. Implicit to this assumption is the idea that agents need cash balances 
only  for  private  consumption  transactions.  However,  in  the  case  of  a  tax financed  fiscal 
expansion agents also need cash balances to pay taxes. In order to take account of all types of 
transactions Carré and Collard (2003) and Steffen (2005) introduce money through a cash in 
advance constraint. 





Κ , corresponds to the disutility generated by 
higher production due to the increase in labor effort and the resulting decrease in leisure. The 
disutility may increase for a given level of production if there is an exogenous fall in labor 
productivity, i.e. an increase in Κ . 
Several authors like Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Ganelli (2005b) relax the assumption 
of consumer producer households and introduce an explicit labor market. In this case, the 





Κ  which translates the disutility from 
increasing  the  quantity  of  labor 
j
s l supplied  by  household  j.  The  quadratic  and  additively 
separable form of labor disutility is retained in most of the NOEM models except for Carré 
and Collard (2003) where consumption and leisure are considered as non separable. 
In the benchmark model, public spending is assumed to be pure waste. This assumption is 
not  crucial  in  models  that  aim  to  compare  the  impact  of  fiscal  expansion  on  key   7 
macroeconomic variables under alternative regimes. However, the nature of public spending 
becomes crucial in models that aim a welfare based analysis of fiscal policy efficiency. In 
models with a welfare analysis, generally public spending enters in the utility in an additively 
separable form. One exception is Ganelli (2003) where public and private expenditures are 
considered as non separable. This implies a direct but imperfect substitution between public 
and private consumption. As such, it becomes possible to consider a direct crowding out 
effect of public spending on private consumption
1. 
The preferences of the representative foreign household 
* j  are given similarly to equation 
(1), where an asterisk denotes foreign variables. The parameters that affect the utility, such as 
χ and  Κ , are also identical across countries. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) allow for different 
values  of  these  parameters  at  home  and  abroad,  but  this  assumption  does  not  have  a 
significant effect on the implications of their model. 
 
2.2 Private Consumption 
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where  ct
j  represents  the  agent  j’s  consumption  of  good  z.  According  to  (2)  agents  are 
indifferent to the origin of goods they consume and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
θ between goods produced within a country is the same for home and foreign goods. The 
latter implies that the intratemporal substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods is 
also equal to θ. Hence the foreign consumption index is identical to equation (2). 
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) show empirically using data on Canadian intra 
provinces trade flows and those between provinces and U.S., that households of a country 
have a stronger preference for goods produced within the country. The analysis in the baseline 
model is extended by Warnock (1998) to take account of consumption preferences that are 
biased towards domestically produced goods. The introduction of a home bias in consumption 
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1 This specification of public spending is considered by Heijdra and Lighart (1997) and Finn (1998) in a closed 
economy context.   8 
where 
H
t C  and 
F
t C  represent respectively the home consumption of home and foreign goods. 
If the bias parameter ϖ is greater than  1
2, home households have higher preferences for the 
goods produced in the home country. 
Tille (1999) argues that the assumption of identical substitution elasticity between home 
and foreign goods rules out the possibility of specialization in the production of different 
goods at the international level, a situation that is empirically observed. Such a possibility 
implies that the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within a country must be 
higher than the substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods. According to Tille 
(1999), Marshall Lerner Robinson condition holds when the substitution elasticity between 
home and foreign goods is greater than one. This indicates that an increase in the consumption 
of home goods following a fall in home relative prices is sufficiently large to increase the 
sales revenue of home producers. 
Instead  of  the  CES  specification  of  the  consumption  index  in  the  benchmark  model, 
Corsetti  and  Pesenti  (2001)  consider  a  Cobb Douglas  specification  as  follows: 
γ γ − =




t t C C C . This implies that the share of home goods in the consumption bundle 
may be different from that of foreign goods ( 2 / 1 ≠ γ ) and that the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign goods is equal to one. While this specification of the consumption 
index  has  the  advantage  of  allowing  for  analytical  solutions  without  resorting  to  local 
approximations, it eliminates the international transmission channel of fiscal policy through 
the current account balance considered by O R. 
Most of the NOEM models assume that all goods are internationally tradable. However, it 
is possible to introduce in a two country setup the distinction made in the appendix of O R 
(1995) between a non tradable goods sector with imperfect competition and a tradable goods 
sector with perfect competition in a small open economy framework. 
 
2.3 Wages and Prices 
In  the  baseline  model,  the  prices  of  home  and  foreign  goods  ( ) t p z   and 
*( ) t p z  
respectively,  expressed  in  local  currency,  are  completely  fixed  in  the  first  period  which 
corresponds  to  the  short  run,  but  they  are  perfectly  flexible  in  the  second  period  which 
represents the long run. As an alternative to this definition of price rigidity, several authors 
like  Sutherland  (1996)  and  Pierzioch  (2004a,  b)  among  others,  consider  a  progressive 
adjustment  of  prices  through  Calvo  (1983)  pricing  decisions.  However,  because  of  this   9 
assumption, the solutions obtained in these models are numeric in contrast to the benchmark 
model. 
The  law  of  one  price    ( ( ) t p z = t e
*( ) t p z )  along  with  the  assumption  of  identical 
preferences implies that the purchasing power parity (PPP) holds:  P t = et P t
* . The nominal 
exchange rate  et  is defined as the home currency price of one unit of foreign currency. The 
overall home and foreign price indexes  P t  and 
*
t P are defined as the minimum expenditure 
required to purchase one unit of the composite consumption good given in equation (2) and its 
foreign analogue. They are defined as CES aggregators over home and foreign single goods 
prices. When the composite consumption good is in Cobb Douglas form as in Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2001), the overall price indexes are also in Cobb Douglas form. 
The  exchange  rate  flexibility  enables  adjustment  through  relative  prices  even  if  home 
(foreign) goods prices expressed in home (foreign) currency are fixed in the short run. This 
adjustment mechanism exists in Mundell Fleming models and in the most NOEM models. It 
is based on the assumption that export goods prices are fixed in the currency of the producer 
country (Producer Currency Pricing  PCP). In this case any variation of the nominal exchange 
rate is entirely reflected on the prices of these goods expressed in currency of the importing 
country  and  thereby  on  the  consumer  prices  (perfect  pass through).  This  implies  that  the 
equilibrium real exchange rate is equal to one. 
However, the empirically observed fluctuations in the real exchange rate suggest that the 
exchange rate pass through on national prices is incomplete. Indeed, some producers fix their 
prices in the currency of the importing country (Local Currency Pricing  LCP)
2. Hence, a 
variation of the nominal exchange rate has no effect on the foreign currency price of these 
goods and only a partial effect on consumer price index depending on the share of firms 
practicing LCP. As a result, PPP no longer holds and the expenditure switching effect of the 
exchange rate is lower. 
Betts and Devereux (2001) introduce LCP into the benchmark model to study the impact 
of a monetary and fiscal expansion on key macroeconomic variables under the assumption of 
local currency pricing. Carré and Collard (2003) and Steffen (2005) also assume that a fixed 
share of home and foreign firms set their prices in the buyer’s currency and use this setup to 
assess the impact of a change in this share on the implications of a fiscal expansion. 
                                                 
2 Engel (2002) provides various explanations for imperfect pass through and reviews alternative NOEM setups 
to address this issue.   10 
Instead of considering short run price rigidity, it is possible to introduce another type of 
nominal  rigidity  in  O R  (1995)  assuming  that  wages  are  fixed  due  to  monopolistically 
supplied labor while goods prices are completely flexible. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) assume 
wage rigidity rather than price rigidity but the authors show that wage rigidity automatically 
implies price rigidity when the demand elasticity is constant since in this case prices are a 
constant mark up over wages. 
 
2.4 Public Spending 
In the baseline setup for fiscal policy analysis, the public sector consists of a passive 
central bank controlling the money supply and of a fiscal authority pursuing discretionary tax 
financed fiscal policy. Hence, without seignorage, the budget constraint of the public sector is 
given as follows: 
t t T G =                       (4) 
Since ricardian equivalence holds in this setup, it is possible to exclude debt financed 
public spending from (4) without loss of generality. 
Real home per capita public demand is defined similarly to the private consumption index 
given in (2) so that public consumption index is a CES aggregator over all available goods 












dz z g G t t                   (5) 
In  equation  (5),  the  intratemporal  substitution  elasticity  of  public  consumption  θ  is 
identical  to  that  of  private  consumption.  A  distinction  between  the  two  elasticites  is 
considered  by  Ganelli  (2008)  in  order  to  study  the  effect  of  a  fiscal  policy  that  aims  at 
changing the elasticity of public demand thereby influencing the monopoly power of private 
firms. 
According to (5), public spending falls equally on all existing goods implying that public 
demand  t g  for a typical good z is not biased towards domestically produced goods. Models 
that introduce some degree of home bias in private consumption, such as Warnock (1998), 
assume that public demand is also biased. However, Trionfetti (2001) shows that in major 
developed countries the public sector imports are significantly less than the imports of the 
private sector. This difference in private and public preferences is considered in Tille (1999) 
and  Corsetti  and  Pesenti  (2001)  by  assuming  full  home  bias  in  public  spending  whereas   11 
private  households  are  assumed  to  be  completely  indifferent  to  the  origin  of  goods  they 
consume. 
Similar  to  most  research  on  fiscal  policy,  the  benchmark  model  assumes  that  public 
spending is composed of goods purchases only. This assumption is relaxed for the first time 
by  Finn  (1998) using US data. The author distinguishes between the public purchases of 
goods and the remuneration of state employees within the framework of a real business cycle 
model. This distinction is first introduced into the NOEM setup by Ganelli (2005b). Ganelli 
and Tervala (2007) considers also a distinction in the public purchases of goods between 
those that improve the productivity of private firms and those that increase household welfare. 
 
2.5 Household’s Optimal Decisions 
In  O R  (1995),  the  representative  home  household  is  subject  to  the  following  budget 
constraint: 
j
t M 1 − + ) ( ) ( j y j p t t + (1+ )
j
t t t P r B =
j




t tT P +
j
t tB P 1 +         (6) 
In equation (6), the resources of the household in period t consists of his nominal income 
from production ( ) ( )
j
t t p z y z , of cash balances carried over from the previous period  Mt
j
−1 and 
of  the  value  of  his  financial  investment  on  a  riskless  real  bond  Bt
j .  Assets  are  denoted 
according  to  their  due  date.  Hence,  Bt
j refers  to  assets  purchased  at  the  beginning  of  t 1 
arriving at maturity at the beginning of t with a real rate of return rt . 
These resources are used for consumption  PC t t
j, for lump sum tax payments 
j
t tT P , and 
for purchasing financial assets PB t t
j
+1 and cash balances  Mt
j  to be carried over to period t+1. 
Household j determines his demand for a single  good z by maximizing  (2) under his 













                  (7) 
Public demand for a typical good z is defined similarly to the private demand (7) on the 
basis of the public consumption index (5).  
Aggregating private and public demand for good z it is possible to define the total demand 
faced by the producer of a typical good z as follows: 
( )
( ) ( )








= +  
 
                (8)   12 
In  equation  (8),  the  world  private 
w
t C   and  public  demand 
w
t G   are  defined  as 
* ) 1 ( t t
w
t C n nC C − + =  and 
* (1 )
w
t t t G nG n G = + − . The home and foreign relative price of the 
good  z  are  identical  since  the  assumptions  of  PPP  and  the  law  of  one  price  imply 
t t P z p ) ( =
* * ) ( t t P z p . 
Home household j maximizes individual utility given in (1) with respect to  Bt
j
+1,  Mt
j  and 
yt
j  under the budget constraint (6) taking into account the goods demand given in (8). The 
first order conditions imply: 
1 1 (1 )
j j















































                (9c) 
The  consumption  Euler  equation  (9a)  characterizes  the  intertemporal  consumption 
smoothing behavior for a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Equation (9b) gives the 
optimal money demand in terms of consumption and the nominal interest rate. Equation (9c) 
gives the optimal trade off between labor and leisure, which holds only in the long run since 
in the short run supply is demand determined due to price rigidity. 
Households’ consumption smoothing behavior leads to current account movements. The 
current account balance for the home country is defined as follows: 
1
( ) t t
t t t t t t
t
p h y
B B rB C G
P
+ − = + − −               (10) 
The  first  order  conditions  are  similar  for  the  foreign  country  and  its  current  account 
balance is complementary to (10). 
If public and private consumption are non separable as in Ganelli (2003), equations (9a) 
(9c) depend not only on private consumption but also on public spending. Hence, fiscal policy 
has a direct effect on money demand similarly to the cash in advance specification in Carré 
and Collard (2003) where agents need money to pay taxes and consumption expenditures. 
 
2.6 Solving the Model 
In order to analyze the short and long run effects of fiscal policy, O R (1995) take a first 
order approximation to the model around a symmetric steady state.   13 
In the steady state, prices are flexible and each variable is constant over time
3. The steady 
state is symmetric in the sense that each producer in each country chooses the same price and 
the same level of production and each household consumes the same quantity of goods. 
When consumption is constant across periods, home and foreign Euler equations imply 




1 * r r                     (11) 
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− =                (12b) 
where  0 ) 1 (
* = − + B n B n . 
The benchmark model solves for the symmetric steady state assuming that initial foreign 
asset  holdings  and  public  spending  are  equal  to  zero  in  each  country:  = 0 B 0
*
0 = B   and 
= 0 G 0
*
0 = G  where the subscript zero indicates this initial steady state. Then equations (12a) 
and (12b) yield  0 0
*
0 0 = = = = y y C C . Combining this result with the steady state versions of 
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                  (14) 
The short and long run log linear equations are given in appendix A where all variables 
are expressed in terms of their deviations from the steady state. 
Ghironi (2006) criticizes O R (1995) for postulating an initial level of foreign assets in 
order to be able to solve for the steady state. Indeed, this assumption leads to steady state 
indeterminacy in O R (1995). The steady state current account equations (12a) and (12b), 
which express consumption in terms of foreign asset holdings, imply that any level of foreign 
assets is compatible with the assumption of fixed consumption across periods. Hence, when 
an  initial  level  of  foreign  assets  is  postulated  arbitrarily,  the  steady state  defined  as  such 
becomes  also  arbitrary.  However,  in  some  models,  the  sign  and  the  magnitude  of  fiscal 
multipliers may depend on the initial asset distribution across countries. Hence, an arbitrary 
                                                 
3 An overbar indicates steady state variables.    14 
choice  of  asset  levels  may  limit  the  generality  of  the  results  of  the  benchmark  model. 
Moreover, relative consumption follows a random walk in O R (1995). Hence, any shock that 
changes current consumption has permanent effects and the economy does not return to its 
initial steady state following a temporary or permanent fiscal shock. 
To eliminate the non stationary nature of the steady state, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) 
offer a setup which shuts off the international wealth distribution through current account 
movements  by  combining  the  PPP  assumption  and  the  Cobb Douglas  consumption  index 
while  keeping  the  assumption  of  zero  initial  foreign  assets.  These  assumptions  lead  to  a 
constant  value  of  relative  consumption  making  it  possible  to  obtain  analytical  solutions 
without  resorting  to  an  approximation.  Another  solution  to  the  stationarity  problem  is  to 
assume that financial markets are complete. In this case, asset accumulation does not affect  
 
3 The Effects of Fiscal Policy in Deterministic NOEM Models 
The  benchmark  model  is  extended  by  relaxing  several  highly  restrictive  assumptions 
namely on the structure of public spending, the individual preferences and the international 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy effects. 
 
3.1 Fiscal Policy in the Benchmark Model 
The implications of the benchmark model on the effects of fiscal policy are different from 
those  obtained  in  flexible  price  models  or  in  Mundel Fleming  models.  Therefore  it  is 
necessary to confront these results with those obtained in recent  empirical work on open 
economy issues. 
3.1.1 The Effects of a Home Fiscal Expansion 
The short and long run effects of a tax financed temporary or permanent home fiscal 
expansion on key macroeconomic variables in the benchmark model are derived in Appendix 
B
4. Table 1 below gives the sign of the effects of home fiscal expansion. 
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Temporary  − − − −  +  +  +  − − − −  +  +  − − − −  +  − − − −  0  − − − −  + 
Permanent  − − − −  +  +  − − − −  − − − −  +  +  +  +  +  − − − −  − − − −  + 
                                                 
4The  deviation  of  any  short  run  variable  x  with  respect  to  its  initial  steady state  value  0 x   is  expressed  as 
0 0 0 / ) ( ~ x x x x dx x − ≅ = . Similarly, the deviation of any long run variable  x  with respect to its initial steady 
state  0 x  is defined as  0 0 / ) ( ~ x x x x − = . Since the initial values of public demand and foreign assets are zero 
by assumption, their relative deviations are given with respect to the value of initial consumption  0 C  or 
*
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In the short run where prices are fixed, a permanent home fiscal expansion ( 0
~ ~
> =G G ) 
leads to an increase in home and foreign output due to the absence of home bias in public 
spending. However, higher tax burden on home households creates a negative wealth effect at 
home and home consumption falls. This reduces home money demand, while money supply is 
constant by assumption. Money market equilibrium is restored through a depreciation of the 
home currency. The short run exchange rate increase is identical to the long run increase 
which implies no over or undershooting of the exchange rate. Consumption increases in the 
foreign country because of higher income due to higher output. 
The expenditure switching effect of home currency depreciation increases home output 
and decreases the foreign. The fall in foreign output is stronger than the initial increase due to 
higher home public demand and foreign output falls overall. Home currency depreciation 
increases home exports more than the increase in imports due to higher public demand and the 
home country runs a current account surplus. 




= > G G )  implies  a  lower  tax  burden  with 
respect to the permanent expansion case. This determines a less pronounced decline in the 
demand for money and a lower depreciation of the home currency. Therefore, the expenditure 
switching  effect  is  too  weak  to  more  than  compensate  the  initial  positive  effect  of  fiscal 
expansion on foreign output and the negative impact on the current account. As a result, 
foreign income increases and the home country runs a déficit. 
In the long run where prices are flexible, a temporary home fiscal expansion decreases 
home  consumption  and  increases  the  foreign.  Indeed,  the  debt  accumulation  due  to  trade 
deficit in the short run leads to higher interest burden at home in the long run. For the same 
reason,  foreign  agents  enjoy  higher  capital  income.  Home  households  work  harder  and 
consume less leisure as implied by the labor leisure trade off equation. Therefore long run 
home output increases while foreign output falls. 
A temporary home fiscal expansion reduces home short run and long run consumption in 
the  same  way.  Hence,  the  intertemporal  consumption  profile  remains  unchanged  which 
implies  that  the  short  run  real  interest  rate  is  not  affected  by  a  temporary  home  fiscal 
expansion. In contrast, the interest rate decreases when the fiscal expansion is permanent, 
since in this case home short run increases relative to long run consumption. 
A permanent expansion leads to an increase in foreign long run consumption and home 
long  run  output  whereas  home  consumption  falls  as  in  the  temporary  expansion  case.  In 
contrast to a temporary expansion, it increases foreign long run output. The reason is that, the   16 
expenditure switching effect of a fall in relative prices is lower in the permanent expansion 
case since the fall in home consumption is mitigated by the positive effect of the interest 
income from  current account surplus. Hence, the initial increase in foreign output due to 
higher home public demand dominates the relative price effect and foreign output increases 
overall when home fiscal expansion is permanent. 
It is possible to evaluate welfare effects of fiscal policy by using the individual utility 
functions assuming that utility from money balances are negligible with respect to utility from 
consumption and leisure.  
Differentiating equation (1), excluding money balances, yields the following expression 
for home welfare: 















− =               (15) 
Equation (15) states that a temporary or a permanent home fiscal expansion reduces home 
welfare because it leads to a fall in consumption and leisure both in short and in long run. In 
contrast, a temporary home fiscal expansion enhances foreign welfare despite its negative 
effect on short run leisure by increasing long run leisure and short and long run consumption. 
A permanent home fiscal expansion also enhances foreign welfare despite the fall in long run 
leisure. Therefore, in the benchmark model fiscal policy is beggar thyself and prosper thy 
neighbor. 
 
3.1.2 Reconciling Theory and Evidence 
The impact of fiscal policy in open economies is the subject of theoretical and empirical 
debate on the validity of alternative models and the practical relevance of the implied policy 
prescriptions. This debate has mostly developed in two areas. One concerns the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy which is measured by its effect on welfare, hence depends on its effects on 
consumption and income. The other concerns the capacity of a country to reduce its trade 
deficit which depends on the relationship between variations in public spending and trade 
balance. 
According to O R (1995), a fiscal expansion in one country leads to an increase in output 
and a decline in private consumption in this country. These effects are the same as those 
obtained in the neo classical models, such as Baxter and King (1993). They differ from those 
obtained by the Keynesian macro models, such as that of Frenkel et al. (2002) in which a 
fiscal expansion increases income and private consumption.    17 
Several empirical studies estimate the impact of fiscal policy on consumption and output 
and compare their results with those implied by theoretical models. These studies use mostly 
structural VAR models with alternative identification schemes. Fatás and Mihov (2001) and 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that a fiscal expansion has significant positive effects on 
consumption and income. Burnside et al (2003) also find a positive effect of fiscal policy on 
consumption but this effect is weak.  
Ravn  et  al  (2007)  show  that  these  different  conclusions  result  from  the  nature  of  the 
government  spending  shocks.  Specifically,  the  identification  scheme  in  Fatás  and  Mihov 
(2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) corresponds to an unanticipated fiscal shock, while 
the method used by Burnside et al (2003) implies that the fiscal shock is anticipated. Ravn et 
al (2007) reconcile these findings by introducing a pricing to habits mechanism. In this setup, 
the impact of fiscal policy on consumption depends on whether the fiscal shock is anticipated 
or not. If the fiscal expansion is unanticipated, it increases the domestic private consumption. 
The reason is that the endogenous mark up rate decreases following the fiscal expansion. 
Hence, labor demand increases which raises the real wage. Households consume less leisure 
and  increase  their  goods  demand.  This  effect  may  be  sufficiently  high  to  dominate  the 
negative welfare effect of taxes. In contrast, an anticipated fiscal expansion does not increase 
private consumption. Consumption may even fall immediately after the fiscal expansion as in 
theoretical neoclassical models. A similar mechanism based on mark up rates is present in 
Ganelli (2008). 
Using  other  methods  of  fiscal  policy  identification,  studies  like  Mountford  and  Uhlig 
(2008) conclude that an increase in public expenditure induces a small effect on consumption. 
The co movement of public and current account deficits in the US induces researchers to 
look for some causality between these deficits. However the results of the empirical studies do 
not provide definitive conclusions on this issue. Kim and Roubini (2008) show in a VAR 
model using U.S data between 1973 and 2002 that a fiscal expansion improves the current 
account balance because of its positive effect on private sector savings. This result, which 
differs from the findings of many theoretical models, is obtained in O R (1995) only when 
fiscal expansion is permanent. 
Using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1960 2003 Bussière et al (2005) 
show that trade balance movements are mainly driven by the variations in productivity and 
that the effect of fiscal policy is very weak. Corsetti and Müller (2006) confirm this result for 
relatively closed economies like the U.S and Australia. However, in reltively open economies 
like UK and Canada, a fiscal expansion leads to a significant current account deficit. The   18 
degree of openness is important because the more the economies are open the more the gap 
between home and foreign rate of return of investment increases in response to an increase in 
public spending. A fiscal expansion may lead to a higher level of investment which requires 
an increase in foreign savings due to insufficient domestic savings. 
Using a similar approach to that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Bems et al (2007) also 
find  that  the  increase  in  the  U.S  trade  deficit  during  the  90s  is  due  to  the  productivity 
deviation  in  the  software  sector.  However,  the  authors  find  that  fiscal  policy  plays  a 
significant role in the trade deficit after 2000. 
The  sometimes  contradictory  results  of  the  empirical  studies  on  fiscal  policy  have 
stimulated theoretical research. The latter has rapidly grown in recent years following the 
extensions  of  O R  (1995)  by  introducing  alternative  structures  of  public  spending,  by 
considering  alternative  specifications  of  individual  preferences  and  by  enriching  the 
international transmission channels of fiscal policy. 
 
3.2  The  Structure  of  Public  Spending  and  Alternative  Specifications  of  Household 
Preferences 
The definition of public spending in the benchmark model is quite restrictive in that it 
considers  public  spending  consisting  only  of  goods  purchases.  This  may  explain,  at  least 
partially, the divergence between the empirical findings and the theoretical results of O R 
(1995), especially those concerning the effect of fiscal expansion on consumption. 
Ganelli  (2005b)  considers  a  richer  structure  of  public  spending.  Specifically,  public 
spending is assumed to be composed of goods purchases and provision of public services. In 
addition, the model incorporates two types of labor market: one for the private sector and 
another for the public sector. This allows to consider the effects of fiscal policies currently 
implemented in most countries, such as reducing the number of state employees in order to 
cut taxes. When this type of policy is temporary, it leaves domestic short run consumption 
unchanged since lower  taxes offset lower income of public  employees.  In contrast, when 
fiscal policy is permanent, it causes an increase in short run domestic consumption because 
agents anticipate a subsequent reduction in taxes. Moreover, employment in the private sector 
increases thanks to the flexibility of prices in the long run, which compensates the reduction 
in public employment. In the long run, the consumption and output gaps across the countries 
increase. 
This  type  of  public  spending  structure  also  allows  for  alternative  definitions  of  fiscal 
policy  by  introducing  a  trade off  between  the  provision  of  public  services  and  goods   19 
purchases.  If,  for  example,  home  fiscal  authority  aims  at  reducing  wage  payments  in  the 
public sector in order to finance an increase in goods purchases, the effect of fiscal policy on 
key  macroeconomic  variables  becomes  ambiguous.  Indeed,  reducing  the  number  of  state 
employees leads to an income loss which decreases home consumption. On the other hand, 
higher public demand increases home output as in the benchmark model which has a positive 
effect on home consumption. The net effect depends on the share of income induced by public 
employment. The higher the share of public wages in total income, the higher is the negative 
effect of fiscal policy on home consumption.  
As in the benchmark model, Ganelli (2005b) assumes that public spending is pure waste, 
which is crucial when carrying out a welfare based evaluation of policy efficiency. Indeed, 
the introduction of public spending in the individual utility function may mitigate or reverse 
the negative effect of fiscal policy on consumption and leisure and hence on welfare.  
Ganelli  and  Tervala  (2007)  introduces  the  public  spending  in  the  utility  function  by 
distinguishing between public infrastructure expenditures which can improve the productivity 
of private firms and public spending on goods and services which have a direct impact on 
household utility. The authors show that a permanent domestic shift in the composition of 
public spending toward public infrastructure expenditures increases the domestic output and 
consumption. The domestic welfare may increase or decrease depending on the productivity 
gains relative to the consumer welfare losses. The foreign welfare falls in the short run and 
increases  in  the  long  term.  This  can  lead  to  a  virtuous  technological  cycle  if  the  foreign 
country  reacts  to  the  fall  in  short  run  foreign  welfare  by  increasing  foreign  public 
infrastructure expenditures. 
Ganelli  and  Tervala  (2007)  introduce  public  spending  in  the  utility  function  in  an 
additively separable way, which implies that it does not affect the responses of key variables 
but affects only the welfare implication of fiscal policy. However, if public spending enters in 
a non separable way as in Ganelli (2003), the impact of fiscal policy on key variables differs 
from those implied in the benchmark model. The non separability between public and private 
consumption implies that these two are direct substitutes and thus public spending has a direct 
crowding out  effect  on  private  consumption.  In  this  setup,  the  short  run  results  are 
qualitatively the same as in the baseline model. However, the effects of fiscal policy on home 
and foreign output and  on exchange  rate  are mitigated.  In contrast, because of the direct 
crowding out effect, the impact on home consumption is amplified. The long run effect of a 
domestic fiscal expansion is the same as in the short run for home consumption and for home 
and  foreign  income,  but  the  effects  on  foreign  consumption  and  foreign  welfare  are   20 
ambiguous. The mechanism that lies behind these results is the impact of public spending on 
money  demand.  Indeed,  following  an  increase  in  public  spending,  the  marginal  utility  of 
private  consumption  falls  due  to  the  non separability  feature.  Therefore,  agents  are  less 
induced to lower their money demand leading to a lower depreciation of the home currency.  
Such a mechanism also exists in NOEM models with cash in advance constraint as in 
Steffen (2005). Since agents need cash in order to pay taxes, an increase in public spending, 
hence in taxes, increases money demand. Therefore, in contrast to the benchmark model, the 
exchange rate falls when the money supply is constant. This leads to an expenditure switching 
effect towards foreign goods, which decreases the short run home output while increasing the 
foreign. However the appreciation of the exchange rate does not alter qualitatively the effects 
of a fiscal expansion on other key variables. 
The impact of fiscal policy can be mitigated if agents have a higher preference over the 
goods produced within their country. The introduction of such a bias in preferences may be 
important  for  fiscal  policy  implications.  For  example,  a  complete  home  bias  in  public 
spending as in Ganelli (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) leads to an equal change in 
short  run  home  output  following  a  temporary  home  fiscal  expansion  leaving  all  other 
variables unchanged. When the home bias concerns both public and private preferences as in 
Warnock (1998), the current account surplus following a temporary fiscal expansion increases 
with the degree of home bias. Indeed, the positive effect of the home currency depreciation on 
the current account is amplified by the impact  on imports which increases with the bias. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the benchmark model, the purchasing power parity no longer holds 
and home bias in household preferences leads to exchange rate overshooting. 
 
3.3 The International Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy 
In the baseline model, the international transmission mechanism of the effects of fiscal 
policy is based on restrictive assumptions concerning the degree of substitution between the 
products and the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on product prices. The current account 
movements also play a central role in the transmission of fiscal policy effects. By introducing 
different  substitution  elasticities  between  the  goods  and  incomplete  pass through  and  by 
considering  alternative  specifications  of  the  role  of  current  account,  one  can  modify  the 
reallocation of consumption across countries and obtain a more detailed transmission channel 
for fiscal policy. 
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3.3.1 The Role of Intratemporal Substitution Elasticity between Goods 
O R  (1995)  assumes  the  same  intratemporal  substitution  elasticity  between  goods 
consumed by private and public sectors and between home and foreign goods. 
Since this model introduces public expenditure in the same form as private spending, it 
cannot analyze the possibility of a structural policy which consists of increasing the price 
elasticity of public consumption.
5 This type of policy will reduce the monopoly power of 
private firms that sell goods to the government and improve the efficiency of discretionary 
fiscal policy. Ganelli (2008) considers that the UK government has taken such a measure in 
the late 1970s by setting the amount of public spending in nominal terms rather than in real 
terms. Indeed, this implies an increase in the price elasticity of public spending since this 
elasticity is equal to zero when fiscal spending is fixed in volume. 
In order to consider the effects of this type of policy on the efficiency of public spending, 
Ganelli (2008) extends the basic model by distinguishing the substitution elasticity between 
goods consumed by public sector from that of goods consumed by the private sector. As in O 
R (1995), a permanent home fiscal expansion reduces the home short run consumption and 
increases  the  foreign  consumption.  However,  the  reduction  of  home  consumption  due  to 
higher taxes is mitigated by an increase in the substitution elasticity η of publicly consumed 
goods. Indeed, the increase in η reduces the mark up rate of private firms. This induces a 
redistribution of resources in favor of private consumers. This implies that the fall in money 
demand and the resulting exchange rate depreciation are also mitigated. This exchange rate 
effect mitigates the increase in foreign private demand for home goods. On the other hand, a 
higher  η  determines  a  higher  foreign  public  demand for  home  goods  since  it  renders  the 
public demand more sensitive to the fall in relative prices. This second effect dominates the 
first one and a higher η amplifies the increase in home short run output. 
The interest income at home resulting from current account surplus is sufficiently high to 
induce an increase in home long run consumption despite higher taxes and higher leisure due 
to  labor leisure  trade off.  In  the  foreign  country  the  higher  interest  burden  mitigates  the 
increase in the long run consumption which implies a lower increase in leisure. 
In this setup, the home fiscal policy has ambiguous effects on welfare in the two countries 
but it is prosper thyself and beggar thy neighbor for plausible values of the parameters. These 
                                                 
5 According to the specification de O R (1996, p.661), the parameter  θ  which represents the intratemporal 
substitution elasticity in (5) is also the price elasticity of the public demand addressed to the private monopolist. 
   22 
effects are amplified by an increase in η which should push the countries with a large public 
sector to take structural measures in order to improve fiscal policy efficiency. 
In contrast to Ganelli (2008), Tille (1999) assumes the same intratemporal substitution 
elasticity  between  goods  consumed  by  private  and  public  sectors  but  allows  for  a  higher 
substitution elasticity between goods produced within a country than that between home and 
foreign goods. This allows for the analysis of the international transmission mechanism of 
fiscal policy in the case of production specialization at the international level. 
If  the  home  permanent  fiscal  expansion  is  limited  to  domestically  produced  goods,  it 
determines an increase in the long run output which increases the marginal cost of labor 
effort.  This  leads  to  an  improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  a  switching  of  private 
consumption toward foreign goods which mitigates the initial increase in home output. This 
expenditure switching effect is high when home and foreign goods are close substitutes, i.e. 
when their substitution elasticity θ  is greater than one. It reduces the real sales revenue at 
home  in  spite  of  higher  home  prices,  which  has  a  negative  effect  on  home  private 
consumption.  In  contrast,  when  home  and  foreign  goods  are  poor  substitutes  (θ <1)  an 
improvement  in  the  terms  of  trade  leads  to  an  increase  in  home  sales  revenues,  which 
increases home consumption. In the short run, home consumption decreases if θ >1 because 
the residents expect a decrease in their future income which implies, as in O R, an increase in 
the exchange rate and a trade surplus. If  θ <1, the home short run consumption increases, 
which induces a home currency appreciation and a trade deficit. 
Fiscal policy is prosper thyself because public spending enters in the utility function. Its 
effect  on  foreign  welfare  is  negative  since  it  worsens  the  terms  of  trade  for  the  foreign 
residents. The effect of fiscal policy increases as the elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign goods fall. 
 
3.3.2 Fiscal Policy and Incomplete Pass-through 
The analysis in Tille (1999) is based on the implications of the substitution elasticity on 
sales revenues. If home and foreign goods are poor substitutes, the expenditure switching 
effect is low and the price increase dominates the fall in quantity. This is because prices are 
set  in  the  currency  of  the  producer  country.  Any  increase  in  prices  at  home  is  reflected 
entirely on foreign prices (perfect pass through). In contrast, if some of the home producers 
set their prices in the importing country’s currency, foreign currency prices will increase only 
partially following an increase in home prices. In this case, home sales revenues increase less   23 
or they may even decrease since it is possible that the quantity fall dominate the price increase 
even if home and foreign goods are not close substitutes. 
The assumption of LCP implies a deviation from the PPP condition. Hence, in contrast to 
O R (1995), in this setup it is possible to have real exchange rate fluctuations. This is true 
only when prices are fixed, because when prices are flexible, firms fix the same mark up over 
wages with the same demand elasticity in each country and the PPP holds regardless of LCP.  
Betts and Devereux (2000) introduce LCP into O R (1995) by assuming that some firms 
set their prices in the buyer’s currency. In this case, the prices of import goods in the foreign 
country are not affected by the variations in the nominal exchange rate implying an imperfect 
pass through.  This,  in  turn,  affects  the  international  transmission  mechanism  of  the  fiscal 
policy. By calibrating their model, the authors show that the assumption of LCP does not 
modify qualitatively the results of O R (1995) based on the assumption of PCP. However, 
under LCP, the reaction of the nominal exchange rate is stronger following an increase in 
home public spending which leads to a higher gap between home and foreign output. 
The welfare analysis in Betts and Devereux (2000) is limited to monetary policy. Steffen 
(2005) provides a welfare analysis for fiscal policy in a setup with LCP assuming that public 
spending is welfare enhancing. He finds that a permanent fiscal expansion at home increases 
home welfare relative to foreign. The welfare distribution across countries becomes more 
asymmetric as the share of LCP firms increases due to the higher expenditure switching effect 
of the nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
 
3.3.3 Fiscal Policy in the Absence of Current Account Dynamics 
In the baseline model, current account movements play a central role in the international 
transmission of the effects of domestic fiscal policy because they induce a reallocation of 
consumption across the countries. The nature of this reallocation depends on financial and 
goods markets structure and on pricing decisions of firms.  
The financial market structure matters for the international transmission of fiscal policy 
because it determines the international risk sharing pattern. Indeed when financial markets are 
incomplete as in O R (1995), fiscal policy induces an asymmetric consumption distribution 
since home households can not fully cover themselves against the risk of an unanticipated fall 
in their relative consumption. In contrast, international consumption risk sharing is full under 
complete financial markets since agents can hold a combination of assets that ensure the same 
marginal  utility  of  consumption  across  countries  in  all  states  of  nature.  However,  the 
assumption  of  complete  financial  markets  shuts  down  the  transmission  channel  through   24 
current account balance. When financial markets are complete agents do not need to borrow 
or lend internationally since consumption risk sharing is perfect.  
Betts and Devereux (2001) compare the transmission of fiscal policy under complete and 
incomplete financial markets. When financial markets are complete, the cost of higher public 
spending at home is shared equally across countries. Fiscal policy affects both countries in the 
same way without any impact on the nominal exchange rate and on current account balance. 
However, under incomplete financial markets, fiscal policy has asymmetric effects on home 
and foreign variables as in O R (1995).  
The  financial  market  structure  becomes  irrelevant  with  Cobb Douglas  consumption 
indexes. As shown in Cole and Obstfeld (1991) a unit elasticity between home and foreign 
goods  imply  that  agents  need  not  borrow  or  lend  internationally  because  relative  price 
movements ensure that home income stays constant in relative terms with respect to foreign 
following  a  policy  shock.  Corsetti  and  Pesenti  (2001)  show  that,  with  Cobb Douglas 
consumption  index,  the  current  account  remains  in  equilibrium  following  a  fiscal  shock 
assuming that initially households do not hold foreign assets
6. In this setup, short run home 
consumption is not crowded out by temporary public consumption which focuses exclusively 
on  domesticaly  produced  goods.  The  only  effect  is  an  equal  increase  in  home  output  at 
unchanged terms of trade. In the long run, the economy returns to the initial equilibrium 
following a temporary fiscal shock. 
When  the  fiscal  expansion  is  permanent,  long  run  consumption  falls  while  and  home 
output and the relative price of home goods increase with respect to the initial equilibrium. 
Since  the  ratio  of  home  and  foreign  consumption  remains  constant  in  equilibrium,  the 
adjustment mechanism is based entirely on terms of trade variations. 
In the long run, the domestic fiscal expansion depreciates the foreign terms of trade and 
reduces the foreign consumption. Its effect on foreign output depends on the value of the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity. If the substitution elasticity is higher than one, home and 
foreign goods are complements. In this case, the demand for foreign goods falls following the 
fiscal expansion and foreign output decreases. In contrast, if home and foreign goods are 
substitutes, the foreign consumption decreases and the output increases. Hence, the effect of 
                                                 
6According  to  Ghironi  (2006),  these  assumptions  cannot  satisfactorily  solve  the  problem  of  non stationary 
equilibrium in O R models, making it difficult to run a comparative static analysis. He proposes to remedy this 
shortcoming through a model that combines the approach of OR with incomplete financial markets and the 
overlapping generations  model of Weil (1989). 
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home fiscal expansion on foreign welfare is ambiguous. However, in contrast to O R (1995), 
it seems to be negative for plausible values of the parameters.  
 
4 Fiscal Policy and Current Macroeconomic Issues  
The baseline model is extended in order to assess the effect of recent macroeconomic 
developments in the world on fiscal policy efficiency. These recent developments cover the 
current macroeconomic issues such as the currency union or the fixed exchange rate regime, 
the enhancement of financial integration and alternative ways of financing public spending. 
 
4.1 Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union or under Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 
Most extensions of the benchmark model retain the assumption of flexible exchange rates. 
However the emergence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the need for candidate 
countries to maintain the exchange rate against the euro within definite limits have induced 
researchers to extend the baseline model to the analysis of fiscal policy effects under fixed 
exchange rates or in a currency union. 
Extending  the  benchmark  model  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  setup,  Caselli  (2001)  and 
Coutinho  (2005)  find  that  a  permanent  tax financed  fiscal  policy  is  beggar thyself  and 
prosper thy neighbor as in the flexible exchange rate case. Indeed fiscal policy has the same 
effect on consumption and output as in O R (1995), but the impact of fiscal policy on the 
interest  rate  depends  on  whether  the  fixed  exchange  rate    is  maintain  unilaterally  or 
bilaterally. 
In a fixed exchange rate system where the home country is concerned with the exchange 
rate stability while the foreign country is only concerned with price stability, Caselli (2001) 
shows that a home fiscal expansion induces an increase in the interest rate. Indeed, because of 
lower home money demand home country must reduce home money supply in order to avoid 
the depreciation of its currency. Foreign money demand increases following the home fiscal 
expansion but the foreign country keeps  the money supply constant in order to guarantee 
price stability. In this case, the money market equilibrium can only be restored through a 
higher interest rate. This type of policy was applied in the 90s by several European countries 
which pegged their exchange rate to the German currency while Germany continued to pursue 
an independent monetary policy aimed at price stability. 
In contrast, if both countries commit to maintaining a fixed exchange rate, they react to 
changes in money demand by adjusting the money supply in the opposite direction. The result 
is a fall in the interest rate as in O R (1995).   26 
By joining a monetary union, countries lose the opportunity to conduct an exchange rate 
policy  and  a  national  monetary  policy.  In  this  case,  national  fiscal  policies  are  the  only 
stabilisation instruments. As shown by Carré and Collard (2003), the transition from a regime 
of flexible exchange rates to a monetary union amplifies the effects of fiscal policy on home 
welfare, while the impact on the foreign welfare is lower. These effects increase as the share 
of LCP firms increases relative to those that set a single price, since an increase in the number 
of LCP firms reduces the expenditure switching effect of a variation of the exchange rate. 
The results imply that, in contrast to the literature on optimal currency areas, a currency 
union does not necessarily improve the welfare of all residents. 
 
4.2 International Financial Market Integration 
Financial market integration at the international level is one of the most visible signs of 
the recent process of globalization. However, full financial integration is not yet achieved. 
Indeed, all potential market participants do not face the same rules, do not have equal access 
to the market and are not treated equally when they take action in the market. However, most 
of the NOEM models with flexible exchange rates assume that international financial markets 
are  perfectly  integrated.  Sutherland  (1996)  is  the  first  to  introduce  imperfect  financial 
integration in a NOEM setup by assuming that agents in one country incur transaction costs 
when buying the assets of the other country. In this case, in contrast to the benchmark model, 
home fiscal expansion tilts the intertemporal consumption profile since it causes a deviation in 
home  and  foreign  interest  rates.  Home  interest  rate  increases  relative  to  foreign  under 
imperfect  financial  integration  and  home  consumption  falls  less  in  the  short  run.  The 
exchange rate depreciates less under perfect integration with respect to imperfect financial 
integration. Hence output increases less which confirms the traditional results of the Mundell 
Fleming models.  
The  increased  consumption  and  output  volatility  following  the  fiscal  policy  under 
imperfect  financial  integration  may  be  mitigated  if  goods  markets  are  also  imperfectly 
integrated. However this leads to stronger exchange rate volatility. This is the result obtained 
by Senay (1998) in a setup with LCP pricing where both financial and goods markets are 
imperfectly integrated, the latter implying that the PPP condition fails to hold in the short run.  
Pierdzioch (2004a) provides a counter example to the results of Sutherland (1996) and 
Senay (1998) which confirm the similarities between the fiscal policy implications in NOEM 
and in Mundell Fleming models. The author introduces nominal income targeting monetary 
policy alongside discretionary fiscal policy in the setup proposed by Sutherland (1996). In this   27 
setup monetary authority reacts by increasing the money supply in response to the impact of 
fiscal policy on output growth. Following a permanent home fiscal expansion, short run home 
output increases more and money supply decreases more under imperfect financial integration 
with respect with the perfect integration case. As prices adjust, the output growth increases 
leading to an increase in the money supply. As a result, the home currency depreciates. This 
depreciation  is  larger  under  high  financial  integration  yielding  a  higher  interest  rate  with 
respect to the low integration regime. Therefore, the home output growth is higher under high 
financial integration in the medium run. A similar result is obtained in Pierdzioch (2005) by 
introducing a home product bias in Sutherland (1996). 
Most of the work regarding currency unions in the NOEM assumes that the existence of a 
common currency leads automatically to full financial integration. The empirically observed 
dissociation between financial integration and monetary integration reported in ECB (2007) 
requires  relaxing  this  assumption.  For  this,  Pierdzioch  (2004b)  extends  the  analysis  in 
Sutherland (1996) to a currency union. The author uses this setup to analyze the impact of 
capital mobility on the propagation of fiscal shocks and their effects on key macroeconomic 
variables. He finds that the effect of the degree of financial integration on the implications of 
fiscal policy is rather weak.  
 
4.3 Fiscal Policy and the Public Debt 
The benchmark model considers only the effects of a tax financed fiscal policy because 
debt financed fiscal policy yields the same results since ricardian equivalence holds in this 
basic setup. Ganelli (2005a) relaxes the ricardian equivalence in order to consider the effects 
of a debt financed fiscal spending in a model which combines the baseline model of O R 
(1995)  and  an  overlapping  generations  (OLG)  model  à  la  Blanchard  (1985).  This  setup 
eliminates the assumption of infinite life time by assuming that at each period of time, new 
agents are born with probability q of surviving the next period. Country population is constant 
across time and households belonging to different age cohorts coexist in each country at each 
period. 
Ganelli (2005a) considers mainly the effects of domestic debt financed tax cut without 
any change in public consumption. In the short run, the initial tax cut is perceived as a net 
increase  in  wealth  because  of  the  positive  probability  of  death.  Indeed,  each  household 
anticipates that the discounted value of his future tax burden will be less than the current tax 
cut because the subjective discount rate which depends on the probability of death is higher 
than the market interest rate. Hence, home relative consumption and money demand increase,   28 
which  implies  a  home  currency  appreciation  in  the  short  run.  The  resulting  expenditure 
switching effect reduces the gap between home and foreign output. The home trade deficit in 
the short run induces home agents to accumulate debt vis à vis the foreign. As a result, long 
run home relative consumption and money demand fall and home currency depreciates.  
Welfare analysis is rather delicate in this setup since several generations coexist at the 
same period of time. Ganelli (2005a) offers a welfare measure which is a weighed average of 
welfare of current and future generations. If the weight on the utility of current generation is 
higher than that of future generations, home relative welfare increases following the debt 
financed tax cut at home. However, if agents put a higher weight on the welfare of future 
generations, home relative welfare falls depending on the size of the home country.  
In this setup, the effects of a tax financed fiscal expansion are the same as in the baseline 
model. In contrast, a debt financed fiscal expansion, which Ganelli (2005a) defines as the sum 
of a debt financed tax cut and a tax financed fiscal expansion, has ambiguous effects on key 
macroeconomic  variables.  However  the  effect  of  the  tax  cut  policy  may  dominate  if  the 
deviation from the ricardian equivalence is sufficiently high. 
The global fiscal model (GFM) developed by the IMF to replace the MULTIMOD model 
considers an OLG setup that is similar to that of Ganelli (2005a). In addition, it introduces 
distortionary taxes and households who have no access to international financial markets. 
Using this setup Botman et al (2006) analyze the effects of a fiscal policy aimed at setting the 
tax  rate  which  allows  the  desired  debt to GDP  ratio.  The  authors  show  that  the  spillover 
effects of a debt financed tax cut depend on the country size because of the impact of this type 
of policy on the world interest rate . Furthermore, taxes on profits have more distortionary 
effects than taxes on wages but these effects are lower with respect to the perfect competition 
case.  
 
5 Fiscal Policy under Uncertainty 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2000,  2002a)  introduce  uncertainty  into  the  basic  deterministic 
model. Their aim is to provide an explicit analytical explanation on the impact of uncertainty 
by considering a second order approximation in contrast to models that neglect the second 
order moments in order to be able to derive exact equilibrium relationships. The authors show 
analytically that, in contrast to first generation models of policy  coordination, uncertainty 
affects not only the variability but also the covariances between key variables of the model.  
This new setup is first used by O R (2002b) and Canzoneri et al (2005) to assess the 
stabilization  role  of  monetary  policy  and  to  evaluate  gains  from  international  monetary   29 
cooperation  on  a  welfare  basis  assuming  that  monetary  authority  reacts  to  exogenous 
productivity  shocks  through  contingency  rules.  Recently,  this  new  setup  is  extended  to 
analyze the stabilization capacity and the international coordination of fiscal policy. These 
extensions assume that the fiscal authorities react to exogenous productivity shocks through 
contingency rules just like the monetary authorities. This assumption reflects the preference 
for automatic fiscal stabilizers which are considered as more flexible than discretionary fiscal 
policy (ECB, 2001). 
In the static stochastic model of O R (2002b) and its extensions, an exact closed form 
solution is obtained for the first and second moments of the endogenous variables which are 
affected by macroeconomic policy. This leads to several simplifications that limit the scope of 
these models. A dynamic approach allows to expand the perspective of these models at the 
cost of greater complexity that requires the use of numerical solutions. 
 
5.1 The Analytical Framework of Static Stochastic General Equilibrium Models 
O R (2002b) describes a setup with two identical countries with flexible exchange rates. 
In contrast to the deterministic model, price indexes and the consumption bundle of home and 
foreign goods are of Cobb Douglas type implying a unit elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign goods. Therefore, the setup excludes international wealth redistribution as 
in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). However, the international consumption risk sharing remains 
imperfect as long as the degree of risk aversion is different from one. Similarly, Sutherland 
and  Lombardo (2004) and Andersen  and Spange (2006) allow  for imperfect risk sharing. 
While in the latter this is achieved by assuming a non unit risk aversion coefficient, in the 
former the imperfect risk sharing is achieved by assuming a consumption bundle of CES type 
instead  of  unit  elasticity  of  substitution  between  home  and  foreign  goods.  In  contrast, 
Coutinho (2008) assumes perfect risk sharing among the two countries.  
Since current account movements are excluded in the setup, a shock during the current 
period does not modify foreign bond holdings which affect the decisions concerning the next 
period. Without this linkage between periods, the analysis is static and concerns only the 
decisions during the period in which the shock occurs. However, the labour supply decisions 
are made in the pre shock period because wages are assumed to be rigid and set by workers 
with monopoly power. 
The  preferences  of  a  representative  household  i  are  defined  by  the  following  utility 
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In (20) ρ represents the coefficient of risk aversion. When ρ has a unit value, consumption 
appears in logarithmic form and (20) boils down to (1). 
Following O R (2002b), international asset trading is excluded in static stochastic models 
of  fiscal  stabilization  except  in  Lombardo  and  Sutherland  (2004).  The  latter  introduces 
financial markets with two types of assets which may ensure perfect risk sharing across two 
countries. Home asset yields a pay off of one unit of disposable income while the foreign 
asset yields one unit of foreign disposable income. As such, the fiscal authority may influence 
the degree of risk sharing through its effect on the disposable income. 
The resources of the representative agent consist of wage income, profit shares  i Π  from 
firm equities and money holdings which are used to finance consumption and tax payments: 
i i
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Maximizing (20) under (21) with respect to the wage rate W(i), taking into account the 
labour demand, yields the optimal preset wage below where φ  is the elasticity of substitution 
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Foreign wages are set similarly by maximizing an analogous utility function subject to 
similar constraints. 
The  optimal  wage  given  in  (22)  which  is  set in  the pre shock  period  depends  on  the 
expected future labour effort i.e. on the uncertainty implied by an eventual productivity shock 
which may trigger a policy reaction. Through this channel uncertainty affects the expected 
levels of consumption, output and the terms of trade. 
In order to adapt the  OR (2002b) setup to the  analysis of fiscal policy, one needs to 
change the specification of this model in such a way that the fiscal policy instrument appears 
in household and firm decisions given by the first order conditions. There are several ways to 
achieve this. First, it is possible to consider that public spending is financed by distortionary 
taxes. The introduction of labor taxes as in Andersen and Spange (2006) implies that the tax 
rate appears directly in (22) and fiscal policy acts through its effect on labor supply. Indeed, 
when a shock occurs, the labor supply decision implied by (22) is no longer optimal. In order 
to restore the optimality of labor leisure trade off, the fiscal authority can manipulate the labor 
supply decision by modifying the labor income tax rate.   31 
If the public spending is financed by firm income taxes as in Coutinho (2008), the tax rate 
appears in the pricing decisions of firms which determine the terms of trade. Hence fiscal 
policy acts through its effect on goods prices in order to manipulate the terms of trade.  
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) offer a second way of introducing a link between first 
order  conditions  and  public  spending.  In  their  setup,  the  international  consumption  risk 
sharing  is  imperfect  and  therefore  the  optimal  choice  of  bond  holdings  depends  on  the 
disposable income which is affected by public spending. 
Two other ways can be offered following the extensions used in deterministic models. 
First, it is possible to consider that public and private consumption are non separable in the 
utility function as in Ganelli (2003). In this case, public spending directly affects the money 
demand and the labor supply decision. Second, it is possible to introduce money demand 
through a cash in advance constraint, as in Carré and Collard (2003). This implies that agents 
need cash in order not only to finance their consumption spending but also to pay lump sum 
taxes. 
The state contingent fiscal rule is defined by the following function where a caret over 
variables denotes the deviation of the variable from its expected level: 
d d w w g κ δ κ δ ˆ ˆ ˆ + =                    (23) 
In what follows lower case will denote the logs of their upper case counterparts so that in 
(23) g may represent the log of public spending or the tax rate depending on the choice of 
fiscal policy instrument. The world shock  w κ  which affects the two countries symmetrically is 
defined as  2 ) (
* κ κ +  while the difference shock has  an  asymmetric effect on home and 
foreign countries and is defined as  = d κ 2 ) (
* κ κ − . The fiscal rule implies that the fiscal 
reaction is conditional on the occurrence of the shock and its magnitude is proportional to the 
innovation  in  the  shock.  The  policy  parameter  δ  determines  the  magnitude  of  the  fiscal 
response.  
Neglecting the utility from money balances, one can express the individual utility function 
in terms of the expected levels of consumption, output and the terms of trade. Taking a second 
order approximation to (22) it is possible to express the expected levels of the terms of trade 
and consumption in terms of second moments of the relevant variables. Therefore, the setup 
allows to express expected welfare in terms of the second moments of the model’s variables. 
When public spending is assumed to be welfare enhancing as in Andersen and Spange (2006) 
and Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), the expected level and the variance of public spending 
also enter directly in the welfare expression.   32 
If  we  choose  to  introduce  fiscal  policy  through  a  cash in advance  constraint,  the  real 
money balances will amount to the sum of private consumption and tax payments in both 
countries. Subtracting the home money demand from foreign making use of the definitions of 
the price indexes, one can derive the deviation of the terms of trade τˆ  from its expected level 
under  fixed  wages.  Adding  up  the  home  and  foreign  money  demand  equations  allows  to 
derive the deviation of consumption c ˆ: 
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Combining equations (23) and (24) allows to compute the second moments of the model’s 
variables in terms of the policy parameter δ and the variance of the shock 
2
i κ σ  where i = w, d. 
For example, if we know the deviation of consumption  c ˆ, and that of the terms of trade τˆ  
then the covariance between the two is given by  τ σ τ ˆ ˆ c c =  which will be a function of  g ˆ  and 
hence a function of the policy parameter and the variance of the shock as implied by (23). 
Having determined the second moments as a function of the policy parameters and the 
variance of the shock, we can express the expected welfare as: 
) , , (
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Under the Nash regime, home fiscal authority maximizes (25) with respect to δ while the 
foreign fiscal authority maximizes the foreign analogue with respect to 
* δ . When home and 
foreign fiscal authorities decide to cooperate they maximize the weighed average of (25) and 
its foreign counterpart with respect to their own policy parameters. This yields the optimal 
policy coefficients under Nash and under cooperation. Introducing the optimal values of δ and 
* δ  into (25) and its foreign analogue yields the expected home and foreign welfare under 
Nash and cooperation regimes.  
 
5.2 Fiscal Stabilization and Coordination in Static Stochastic Models 
In static stochastic models of fiscal stabilization and coordination, fiscal authorities face 
two major distortions stemming from the imperfect sharing of consumption risks and from 
wage  rigidity.  Imperfect  consumption  risk  sharing  increases  consumption  volatility  and 
thereby reduces welfare. Moreover, since wages are set before the shock occurs, the preset 
wage  becomes  suboptimal  following  the  productivity  shock  which  perturbs  the  trade off 
between marginal utility of consumption and leisure. Fiscal authorities aim at restoring the 
optimal consumption leisure trade off and at reducing consumption volatility by improving   33 
risk sharing. However, in some cases, policy makers can face a trade off between these two 
targets which makes it impossible to achieve the flexible wage level of welfare. 
International consumption risk sharing is perfect when productivity shocks are symmetric 
across countries or when the coefficient of risk aversion is equal to one. In this case, the only 
distortion  is  wage  rigidity.  Hence,  fiscal  authorities  in  both  countries  can  eliminate  this 
distortion and achieve the flexible wage welfare under both Nash and cooperative games. In 
contrast when risk sharing is imperfect, fiscal authorities have to choose between improving 
risk  sharing  and  eliminating  wage  distortions.  International  fiscal  cooperation  privileges 
improving  the  risk  sharing  while  Nash  strategies  aim  at  reducing  distortions  from  wage 
rigidity. Hence a discrepancy between Nash and cooperative results occurs. This difference 
allows to assess the gain from international policy cooperation in addition to the stabilization 
gains from Nash strategy. 
Andersen and Spange (2006) consider such gains in a currency union where fiscal policy 
instrument is the labour income tax. In this context, fiscal authority aims at minimizing the 
variability of consumption and output i.e., the labour effort. Optimal fiscal policy indicates a 
positive  value  of  the  policy  parameter  and  hence  a  positive  relationship  between  public 
spending and income implying that optimal fiscal policy is pro cyclical. Combined with the 
positive effect of the terms of trade on home income, the pro cyclical fiscal reaction increases 
income variability at home following a positive productivity shock. On the other hand, home 
fiscal reaction stabilizes home and foreign consumption and foreign output. Hence, it has a 
positive  effect  on  foreign  welfare.  Since  the  spillover  effect  is  positive,  the  cooperative 
response is higher than the Nash response implying that there are gains from international 
fiscal cooperation in the absence of monetary policy. 
The  numerical  analysis  shows  that  the  cooperative  response  is  greater  than  the  Nash 
response and decreases as the share of import goods in the consumption bundle increases i.e., 
as the degree of openness increases. Furthermore, fiscal policy efficiency increases as the 
public sector size becomes larger. However, gains from international fiscal cooperation are 
small in all cases.  
The small cooperation gains are often considered as the result of the structural symmetry 
between the two countries. In order to see this, Spange (2007) introduces a labor market 
asymmetry in Andersen and Spange (2006). Specifically, the author assumes completely fixed 
wages in one country while wages are fully flexible in the other country. The results show that 
gains from fiscal cooperation remain weak despite the asymmetry. However, in contrast to 
Andersen and Spange (2006) the optimal fiscal policy may no longer be pro cyclical in the   34 
two countries. Indeed, a pro cyclical tax policy implemented in the flexible wage country 
may be destabilizing. 
By excluding the possibility of an active monetary policy Andersen and Spange (2006) 
and Spange (2007) overlook the possible interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. 
However, this theme has gained particular importance since the emergence of the European 
currency union. The idea is to verify in a new setup whether following a common monetary 
policy can enhance the efficiency of fiscal policy and induce fiscal cooperation. This idea is 
briefly  analyzed  in  Lombardo  and  Sutherland  (2004).  The  results  show  that  although 
cooperative fiscal policy can not fully eliminate all the distortions, it generates a higher level 
of  welfare  with  respect  to  Nash  strategy  in  a  currency  union.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of 
asymmetric shocks absence of fiscal reaction is preferable to uncoordinated fiscal policy in a 
currency union. 
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) consider mainly the case of flexible exchange rates. The 
authors show that in this case fiscal cooperation alone can not achieve full stabilization if 
monetary policy is absent, but the efficiency of fiscal cooperation is enhanced when home and 
foreign  monetary  authorities  cooperate.  Whether  there  are  gains  from  fiscal  cooperation 
depends on the elasticity of substitution when monetary policy is uncoordinated even though 
the  welfare  effects  of  fiscal  cooperation  are  not  large.  However,  the  question  of  fiscal 
cooperation becomes irrelevant under monetary cooperation because coordinated monetary 
policy replicates the flexible wage level of welfare regardless of the fiscal regime.  
Despite the differences in the assumptions of O R (2002b) and Lombardo and Sutherland 
(2004), the mechanism that derives the results is similar in both models. In Lombardo and 
Sutherland (2004), the fiscal or monetary authority has to choose between eliminating wage 
rigidity and improving risk sharing as in O R (2002b). In the former, home policy maker is 
induced to reduce home output when the disutility of work effort increases at home while 
searching to offset the impact of the terms of trade on home output in order to restore the 
optimality of the preset wage. Similarly, home fiscal authority reduces the variability of home 
disposable income in order to shift relative asset prices in favour of home households in order 
to  improve  risk  sharing.  Therefore,  the  trade off  between  these  two  strategies  will  imply 
potential gains from policy cooperation. It is worth noting that the trade off between targeting 
flexible wages and improving risk sharing disappears as in O R (2002b) when risk sharing is 
perfect, i.e. when the shocks are symmetric or when the elasticity of substitution between 
home and foreign goods is equal to one.    35 
In a different perspective than previous studies, Coutinho (2008) adapts O R (2002b) to 
the analysis of optimal taxation by introducing distortionary taxes on firm income which are 
then used to finance transfers to the private sector assuming there is no public spending. Since 
wages are preset but prices are flexible, these distortionary taxes are directly reflected on the 
prices through the mark up rates. Therefore, by modifying the tax rate following common or 
asymmetric labour supply shocks, fiscal authorities are able to affect the terms of trade in 
order to shift demand away from or towards domestic output. This way, fiscal policy can 
affect the marginal utility of consumption in both countries. As in O R (2002b), by making 
transfers  of  tradables  between  the  countries  through  terms  of  trade  manipulations,  fiscal 
authorities  can  improve  international  consumption  risk  sharing.  However,  since 1 = ρ , 
consumption risk sharing is perfect in Coutinho (2008) whatever the nature of the shock. In 
this case, similarly to O R (2002b), monetary policy is capable of achieving the flexible wage 
level of welfare both under Nash and cooperative strategy. Therefore, fiscal authorities need 
not react to shocks when monetary policy is active. However, when the two countries form a 
currency union, fiscal policy becomes the only instrument that allows to react to asymmetric 
shocks. Under Nash strategy each fiscal authority is induced to manipulate the terms of trade 
against the other. Hence there are gains from fiscal cooperation depending on the elasticity of 
labour supply. 
 
5.3 Fiscal Stabilization and Coordination in a Dynamic Setup 
The dynamic stochastic approach allows to extend the analysis of optimal taxation and of 
the interaction between macroeconomic policies which are analyzed in the previous static 
models. 
The adoption of a dynamic perspective allows Kim and Kim (2003) to introduce capital 
into a framework that is similar to O R (2002b). This setup, in which monetary aspects are 
neglected, considers not only income taxes as in Coutinho (2008) but also capital taxes. The 
numerical results show that the optimal tax policy against productivity shocks is pro cyclical. 
By varying the tax rate on labour or capital, fiscal authority affects the components of welfare, 
namely  output  and  consumption,  through  its  effect  on  labor  supply  and  investment.  The 
optimal fiscal response to a productivity shock under capital taxation yields a higher welfare 
with respect to wage taxation. This is because, capital mobility helps agents benefit from the 
productivity differences across countries while the absence of labor mobility limits the impact 
of wage taxation on the production capacity. Both types of taxation policy imply positive   36 
spillover effects. Therefore, fiscal cooperation generates non negligible gains with respect to 
uncoordinated fiscal policy.  
Beetsma and Jensen (2005) reconsider the monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a 
currency  union  setup  which  Lombardo  and  Surtherland  (2004)  have  analyzed  in  a  static 
model.  The  authors  show  how  a  dynamic  structure  can  shed  light  on  the  role  of 
macroeconomic policy credibility, a recurrent theme since the publication of Kydland and 
Prescott  (1977)  and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)
7.  In  contrast  to  O R  (2002b),  the  authors 
assume complete financial markets which imply perfect international risk sharing. Moreover, 
the public spending in each country falls only on domestic goods and it is considered to be 
welfare enhancing as in Andersen and Spange (2006) and Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). 
The dynamics of the setup is based on a process of gradual adjustment of prices described by 
Calvo (1983). This setup is used to study the stabilization role of discretionary policy versus 
commitment policy under cooperative fiscal policy in which inflation plays an important role. 
The commitment of monetary authority to restrictive monetary policy helps reduce the 
inflationary expectations following a symmetric productivity shock which increases inflation 
at  the  union  level.  If  countries  react  identically  to  price  variations  the  impact  of  the 
commitment  on  expectations  is  sufficient  to  stabilize  current  inflation  and  eliminate  the 
consumption gap. In this case the fiscal authority reacts simply by choosing the efficient level 
of  public  spending.  However,  when  there  is  a  variation  in  the  home  inflation  relative  to 
foreign, fiscal policy plays a stabilization role by influencing inflation expectations and by 
reducing the gap between current and steady state terms of trade. This stabilization effect of 
fiscal  policy  is  lower  under  discretion  with  respect  to  commitment  because  the  effect  of 
discretionary fiscal policy on inflation expectations is lower since this type of policy is less 
credible than commitment policies.  
When the two countries react differently to price variations, common monetary policy 
concentrates on the country with higher price rigidity. This creates higher price variability in 
the other country inducing a more aggressive fiscal policy.  
Calibration  shows  that  there  are  non  negligible  stabilization  gains  from  fiscal  policy. 
However, in contrast to the common opinion, these gains do not depend on the correlation of 
shocks.  
By relaxing the assumption of tax financed public spending it is possible to extend the 
monetary  and  fiscal  interactions  analysis  to  that  of  different  ways  of  financing  public 
                                                 
7  Discretionary  and  commitment  policies  are  especially  compared  in  the  recent  literature  by  Dixit  and 
Lambertini (2001), Lambertini (2007) and Chari and Kehoe (2008) in the context of a currency union.   37 
spending. Such an analysis seems to be particularly suitable to the European monetary union 
constrained by the stability and growth pact which draws limits to public debt and deficit. In 
this context it is possible to determine the conditions for optimal financing of public spending 
which  is  contingent  to  the  occurrence  of  the  shock.  It  may  also  give  insight  about  how 
monetary authorities affect the cost or the real value of public debt by varying the money 
supply or the interest rate and thereby modify the optimal public spending finance. However, 
such an analysis concerns literatures other than those that follow directly from O R (2002b)
8. 
6. Conclusion 
The present paper offers a survey of recent research on fiscal policy in both deterministic 
and stochastic models of the new open economy macroeconomics initiated by O R (1995, 
2002b). This new framework is characterized by imperfect markets, explicit cross country 
relations  and  micro founded  welfare  analysis.  It  also  assumes  short run  rigidities  as  in 
Mundell Fleming models. 
This  new  setup  is  used  to  reconsider  several  contemporary  issues  like  the  impact  of 
financial  globalization  on  the  efficiency  of  fiscal  policy,  the  effect  of  fiscal  policy  in  a 
currency union like the European Monetary Union and the role of a  fiscal contraction in 
reducing trade deficits as in the case of U.S.  Moreover, it is used to  further develop the 
traditionally studied aspects of fiscal issues such as the transmission channels of fiscal policy 
which is based on intertemporal optimization decisions and variations of the current account. 
The NOEM framework serves equally well to analyze generally neglected aspects of fiscal 
policy such as the composition of public spending. The latter is particularly important since it 
allows to distinguish between public goods purchases and the provision of public services 
which enables to evaluate the effect of reducing the number of state employees which is a 
source of current debate in some countries. Similarly, it is possible to enrich the analysis of 
fiscal  policy  transmission  channels  by  introducing  international  production  specialization 
possibilities or by diversifying the pricing decisions of firms. In the latter case the imperfect 
pass through  justifies  the  fiscal  intervention  since  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  no  longer 
sufficient to ensure the necessary price adjustments.  
In stochastic models of NOEM, fiscal policy is considered as a stabilization tool against 
exogenous shocks. This definition of fiscal policy is particularly suitable for the members of 
the EMU. Indeed, these countries are induced to switch from discretionary fiscal policy to 
                                                 
8 This question was first addressed in the context of closed economies with perfect competition, especially by 
Lucas and Stokey (1983). It is then extended by introducing imperfect competition and price rigidity as in 
Schmitt Grohe and Uribe (2004). Other researchers such as Lambertini (2007) adapt this setup to a two country 
framework.   38 
automatic  stabilizers  following  the  stability  and  growth  pact.  Moreover,  the  productivity 
shock analyzed in this setup can be considered as resulting from the modification of weekly 
working  hours  which  is  an  ongoing  debate  in  Europe.  The  stochastic  setup  allows  for 
analytical solutions, which show explicitly the effect of uncertainty in all aspects implying 
that the fiscal authority has to take into account not only the variance of the shock but also its 
covariance with the endogenous variables of the model. Furthermore, the analytical solutions 
show that output and inflation are not the only relevant variables for  policy decision but 
consumption and terms of trade are equally important for welfare maximization and hence for 
the design of optimal policy. Finally, this approach allows for an evaluation of gains from 
international fiscal policy cooperation with respect to gains from fiscal stabilization. 
One inconvenience of the NOEM models appears to be the sensitivity of the results to the 
underlying  assumptions.  The  implications  of  fiscal  policy  can  depend  on  whether  public 
spending is welfare enhancing, on how money balances are introduced or on the degree of 
substitution between private and public consumption. Unfortunately, empirical results hardly 
provide a guide for the choice of welfare functions specification. However, they can provide 
guidance for the choice of other factors that can influence the efficiency of fiscal policy. For 
example, Bergin (2004) estimates that in contrast to what economists believed for a long time, 
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is equal to one and a significant 
share of firms apply LCP. 
Despite the new perspectives on the analysis of fiscal policy that NOEM allowed, there 
still remain questions to be answered in future research. First, there has been little attention 
paid on labor market structure and on employment issues in NOEM. Generally, it is assumed 
that  the  representative  household  is  composed  of  agents,  each  of  which  is  employed  and 
provides the same amount of labor. It is possible to introduce unemployment in this setup 
through  the  utility  function,  following  Dotsey  and  King  (2006),  by  assuming  that  the 
representative household is composed of both employed and unemployed agents. In this case 
agents who are employed decide not only to supply more or less labor but also to keep or quit 
their jobs. This allows to analyze the role of labor mobility in the international transmission of 
fiscal policy as well as the impact of fiscal policy on the optimal labor supply and on the ratio 
between employed and unemployed agents. This way, it may be possible to alter the typical 
result in NOEM models which suggests that an increase in public spending always induces 
the representative agent to work harder and hence reduces welfare. 
Second,  most  of  the  NOEM  models  have  limited  the  analysis  of  fiscal  policy  to  tax 
financed policy because of the assumption of ricardian equivalence. Relaxing this assumption   39 
allows  to  consider  alternative  ways  of  financing  public  spending  and  enables  healthier 
comparisons  between  the  results  of  theoretical  analyses  and  those  of  empirical  studies  in 
which ricardian equivalence does not hold. Moreover, tax financed fiscal policy implies that 
the  disposable  income  falls  whenever  public  spending  increases  and  this  reduces  welfare 
because  of  private  consumption  crowding out.  However,  this  crowding  effect  is  likely  to 
disappear if we consider debt financed fiscal policy. Ganelli (2005a) makes the first attempt 
to relax the assumption of ricardian equivalence by assuming that agents have finite lives. He 
uses this setup to compare the efficiency of tax financed fiscal policy to that of debt financed 
public  spending  but  finds  that  the  difference  between  the  two  policies  is  ambiguous. 
Therefore,  more  research  is  needed  to  have  a  robust  conclusion  on  the  optimal  way  of 
financing fiscal policy. For this, one can consider alternative ways of relaxing the ricardian 
equivalence such  as increasing country population offered by Weil (1989) or the rule of 
thumb behavior proposed by Gali et al. (2004). 
A third stream of future research may be developed in the framework of stochastic NOEM  
models. In the latter, the definition of the shock is limited to a labor supply shock. The current 
economic crisis may inspire researchers to extend the stochastic NOEM setup in order to 
consider  more  complex  fiscal  rules  that  react  to  financial  or  demand  shocks.  Indeed  the 
analysis of fiscal policy seems particularly suitable for study demand shocks since public 
demand substitutes private demand naturally. In contrast, in the case of a labor shock fiscal 
policy must be able to affect labor supply decisions in order to play a stabilization role. This 
requires  introducing  fiscal  policy  through  distortionary  taxes  or  through  the  payoff  of 
internationally traded bonds, which complicates the analysis. This, in turn, makes it difficult 
to introduce the traditional features analyzed in the deterministic NOEM models such as the 
imperfect pass through or alternative compositions of public spending if one chooses not to 
sacrifice tractability.  
 
APPENDIX A: Log-linear Version of the Deterministic Benchmark Model 
 
Long run  Short run 
Current account : 
G P y h p B r C
~ ~ ~ ) ( ~ ~ ~
− − + + =     (A1a) 
* * * *
1
* ~ ~ ~ ) ( ~ ~ ~
G P y f p B r C n




)) ( ~ ~ )( 1 ( ) ( ~ ~ * f p e n h p n P + − + =    (A2a) 
) ( ~ ) 1 ( ) ~ ) ( ~ (
~ * * f p n e h p n P − + − =   (A2b) 
Price indexes: 
e n P ~ ) 1 (
~
− =         (A6a) 
e n P ~ ~* − =         (A6b) 
Purchasing power parity: 
* ~ ~ ~
P e P + =         (A7) 
Goods market: 
w w G C e n y
~ ~ ~ ) 1 ( ~ + + − =θ     (A7a)   40 
* ~ ~ ~
P e P + =         (A2c) 
Goods market: 
w w G C h p P y
~ ~
)) ( ~ ~
( ~ + + − =θ     (A3a) 
w w G C h p P y
~ ~
)) ( ~ ~
( ~ * * * + + − =θ    (A3b) 
w w w G C y
~ ~ ~ + =        (A3c) 
Labor leisure trade off: 
w w G C C y
~ ~ ~ ~
) 1 ( + + − = + θ θ     (A4a) 
w w G C C y
~ ~ ~ ~ ) 1 (
* * + + − = + θ θ     (A4b) 
Money demand: 
r C P M β − = −
~ ~ ~
      (A5a) 
r C P M β − = −
* * * ~ ~ ~
      (A5b) 
 
w w G C e n y
~ ~ ~ ~* + + − = θ       (A7b) 
Euler equations: 
r C C ~ ) 1 (
~ ~
β − + =       (A8a) 
r C C ~ ) 1 (
~ ~






− − = −
1
~ ~
~ ~ ~ P P










* * * P P
r C P M   (A9b) 
Current account: 
e n G C y B ~ ) 1 (
~ ~ ~ ~
− − − − =     (A10a) 
e n G C y B
n
n
B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1
~ * * * * + − − =
−
− =   (A10b) 
 
 
APPENDIX B: The Effects of Fiscal Policy 
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Fiscal Policy in the Short Run 
The  short  run  exchange  rate  deviation  and  the  deviation  of  home  relative  short  run 
consumption are derived from the system of two equations given below: 
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The first equation above is derived from short run and long run money demand equations 
(A9a and b) and (A5a and b) together with short and long run PPP equations (A2c) and (A7) 
where   e e ~ ~ = . The second relation above is derived from the real sector of the economy, 
namely from equations (A1a and b), (A4a and b), (A7a and b), (A10a and b) and (A2c). 
Solving the system above allows to determine the impact of fiscal policy on short run 
exchange rate (B3) and on home relative consumption. Knowing the effect of fiscal policy on 
* ~ ~
C C −  and remembering that  0
~
=
w C , we can use the Aoki (1981) method to compute the 
effect of fiscal policy on home and foreign short run consumption (B1a and b).  
Knowing the solution for the exchange rate we can use the difference between home and 
foreign  short  run  goods  market  equations  (A7a  and  b).  Remembering  that 
w w G y
~ ~ = and 
knowing  solution  for  the  relative  home  output,  we  can  use  the  Aoki  method  to  derive 
equations (B2a and b). 
Home current account (B4) can be derived from the difference between (A10a and b) 
introducing (B3) along with the differences between (B1a and b) and (B2a and b) for home 
relative consumption and output respectively.  
It is possible to derive a relation between r ~  and 
w C
~
 from (A8a and b). Introducing (A3c) 
and (A7a and b) into this relationship, it is possible to derive the effect of fiscal policy on 
short run interest rate as given in (B5). 
Fiscal Policy in the Long Run 
Home  relative  long  run  consumption  can  be  derived  as  follows  from  the  difference 




















Introducing  the  above  equation  into  the  difference  between  (A4a  and  b)  yields  the 
following expression for home relative long run output: 
= −
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Using the above equations knowing that 
w w G y
~
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− =  as implied by 
(A3c) and (A4a and b), we can derive the impact of fiscal policy on long run home and 
foreign consumption and output given in (B6a and b) and (B7a and b) according to the Aoki 
method.   42 
References  
 
Andersen, T.M. Spange, M. (2006), “International interdependencies in fiscal stabilization 
Policies”,  European Economic Review, 50, 1169 1195. 
Aoki, M. (1981), Dynamic analysis of open economics, Academic Press, New York. 
Barro, R.J., Gordon, D.B. (1983), “A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate 
model”, Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 589 610. 
Baxter, M., King R. (1993), “Fiscal policy in general equilibrium”, The American Economic 
Review, 83(3), 315 334.  
Beetsma, R.M.W.J., Jensen, H. (2005), “Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro 
founded model of monetary union”, Journal of International Economics, 67(2), 320 
352. 
Bems, R., Dedola, L., Smets, I. (2007), “US imbalances: the role of technology and policy”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, 523 545. 
Bergin  P.  (2006),  “How  well  can  the  new  open  economy  macroeconomics  explain  the 
exchange  rate  and  the  current  account”,  The  Journal  of  International  Money  and 
Finance, 25 (5), 675 701. 
Betts, C., Devereux, M. (2000), “Exchange rate dynamics in a model of pricing to market”, 
Journal of International Economics, 50, 215 244. 
Betts, C., Devereux, M. (2001) “International effects of monetary and fiscal policy in a two 
country  model”.  In:  Calvo,  G.,  Dornbush,  R.,  Obstfeld,  M.  (eds.),  Money,  capital 
mobility and trade: Essays in honor of R.A. Mundell, MIT Press, Cambridge, 9 52. 
Blanchard, O.J. (1985), “Debt, deficits and finite horizons”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 
121 138. 
Blanchard, O., Perotti, R. (2002), “An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of 
changes  in  government  spending  and  taxes  on  output”,  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, 67, 1329 1368. 
Botman, D, Laxton, D,.Muir, D, Romanov,A (2006), “A new open macro model for fiscal 
policy evaluation”, IMF Working Paper, 06/45. 
Burnside  C.,  Eichenbaum,  M.,  Fisher,  J.  (2004),  “Fiscal  shocks  and  their  consequences”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 115(1), 89 117. 
Bussière, M., Fratzshe, M., Müller, G.J. (2005), “Productivity shocks, budget deficits and the 
current account”, ECB Working Paper, 509.   43 
Calvo,  G.  (1983),  “Staggered  contracts  in  a  utility maximizing  framework”,  Journal  of 
Monetary Economics, 12, 383 398. 
Canzoneri,  M.B.,  Cumby,  R.E.,  Diba,  B.T.  (2005),  “The  need  for  international  policy 
coordination: What’s old, what’s new, what’s yet to come”, Journal of International 
Economic, 66, 363 384.  
Carré,  M.,  Collard,  F.  (2003),  “Monetary  union:  A  welfare  based  approach”,  European  
Economic Review, 47, 521 552. 
Caselli, P. (2001), “Fiscal consolidation under fixed exchange rates”, European Economic 
Review, 45, 425 450. 
Chari,  V.,  Kehoe,  P.J.  (2008),  “Time  consistency  and  free riding  in  a  monetary  union”, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 40(7), 1329 1355. 
Cole, H., Obstfeld, M. (1991), “Commodity trade and international risk sharing: How much 
do financial markets matter”,  Journal of Monetary Economics, 28, 3 24. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P. (2001), “Welfare and macroeconomic interdependence”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 66, 421 445. 
Corsetti, G., Müller, G. (2006), “Twin deficits: A squaring theory, evidence and common 
sense”, Economic Policy, 599 638. 
Coutinho, L. (2005), “Fiscal policy in NOEM and prospects for fiscal policy coordination”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 19(5), 789 822. 
Coutinho, L. (2008), “Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains 
from Cooperation?”, Open Economic Review, 19, 81 120. 
Dixit, A., Lambertin, L. (2001), “Monetary –fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus 
discretion in a monetary union”, European Economic Review, 45, 977 987 
Dotsey,  M.,  King,  R.G.  (2006),  “Pricing,  production  and  persistence),  Journal  of  the 
European Economic Association, 4, 893 928. 
Engel, C. (2002), “The responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rates: a synthesis of 
some New Open  Economy Macro models”, The Manchester School, 70, Supplement, 
1 15.  
European  Central  Bank,  (2001),  “Fiscal  policy  and  economic  growth.  European  Central 
Bank”, Monthly Bulletin, 8, 39 54. 
European Central Bank (2007), Financial Integration in Europe. European Central Bank, 
Report ISSN 1830 7159.  
Fatas, A., Mihof, I. (2001), “The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: 
theory and evidence”, CEPR Discussion paper, 2760.   44 
Finn,  M.G.  (1998),  “Cyclical  effects  of  governments  employment  and  goods  purchases”, 
International Economic Review, 39 (3), 635 657. 
Frenkel,  J.A.,  Razin,  A.,  Yuen,  C W.  (2002),  Fiscal  policies  and  growth  in  the  world 
economy, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Gali,  J,  Vallès,  J.,  Lopez Salido,  J.D.  (2007),  “Understanding  the  effects  of  government 
spending on consumption”, Journal of the European Economic Association ,5(1), 227 
270.  
Ganelli,  G.  (2003),  “Useful  government  spending,  direct  crowding out  and  fiscal  policy  
interdependence”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 22(1), 87 103. 
Ganelli, G. (2005), “The NOEM of government debt”, Journal of International Economics, 
65(1), 167 184. 
Ganelli,  G.  (2010),  “The  international  effects  of  government  spending  composition”, 
Economic Modelling, 27(3), 631 640. 
Ganelli,  G.  (2008),  “Public  spending  management  and  macroeconomic  interdependence”, 
Open Economic Review, 19(2), 241 259 
Ganelli,  G.,  Lane,  P.  (2003),  “Dynamic  general  equilibrium  analysis:  the  open  economy 
dimension”  In:    Altug,  S.,Chadha,  J.S.,  Nolan,  C  (eds.),  Dynamic  macroeconomic 
analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.308 333. 
Ganelli, G., Tervala, J. (2010), “Public infrastructures, public consumption, and welfare in a 
New Open Economy Macro model”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(3), 827 837. 
Ghironi, F. (2006), “Macroeconomic interdependence under incomplete markets”, Journal of 
International Economics, 70, 428 450. 
Heijdra, B., Lighart, J.E. (1997) “Keynesian multipliers, crowding out, and optimal provision 
of public goods”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 19 (4), 803 826. 
Helliwell, J. (1996), “Do national borders mater for Quebec’s trade?”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 29(3), 507 522. 
Kim, J., Kim, S.H. (2003) “Welfare effects of tax policy in open economies: Stabilization and 
cooperation”,  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Finance  and 
Economics. Discussion Paper, 2003 51. 
Kim, S., Roubini, N. (2008), “Twin deficit or twin divergence? Fiscal policy, current account, 
and real exchange rate in the US”, Journal of International Economics, 74 (2), 362 
383. 
Kydland,  F.E.,  Presott,  E.C.  (1977),  “Rules  rather  than  discretion:  the  inconsistency  of 
optimal plans”, Journal of political Economy, 85,473 492.   45 
Lambertini, L. (2007), “Optimal fiscal policy in monetary union” Center for Fiscal Policy 
Working Paper, 1/07. 
Lombardo, G., Sutherland, A. (2004), “Monetary and fiscal interactions in open Economies”, 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 26, 319 347. 
Lucas, R.E., Stokey, N.L. (1983), “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without 
capital”, Journal of Monetary Economy, 12, 55–93. 
McCallum, J. (1995) “National border matter: Canada US regional trade patterns”, American 
Economic Review, 85, 615 623. 
Montford, A., Uhlig, H. (2008), “What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks” NBER Working 
Paper, 14551.  
Obstfeld,  M.,  Rogoff,  K.  (1995)  “Exchange  rate  dynamics  redux”,  Journal  of  Political 
Economy, 100 (3), 624 660. 
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K. (1996), Foundations of international macroeconomics, The MIT 
Press 
Obstfeld,  M.,  Rogoff,  K.  (2000),  “New  directions  for  stochastic  open  economy  models”, 
Journal of International Economics, 50, 117 153. 
Obstfeld,  M.,  Rogoff,  K.  (2002a)  “Risk  and  exchange  rates”,  In:  Helpman,  E.,  Sadka  E. 
(Eds.). Contemporary Economic Policy: Essays in Honor of Assaf Razin, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K. (2002b), “Global implications of self oriented national monetary 
rules”, Quarterly Journal of Economic , 117, 503 536. 
Pierdzioch,  C.  (2004a),  “Capital  mobility  and  the  effectiveness  of  fiscal  policy  in  open 
economies”, Journal of Macroeconomics, 26, 465 479. 
Pierdzioch, C. (2004b),  “Financial integration and business cycle volatility in a monetary 
union” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 51(3), 422 442. 
Pierdzioch, C. (2005) “Home product bias, capital mobility, and macroeconomic volatility” 
Oxford Economic Papers, 57(1), 142 156. 
Ravn,  M.O.,  Schmitt Grohé,  S.,Uribe,  M.  (2007)  “Explaining  the  effects  of  government 
spending shocks on consumption and the real exchange rate”, NBER Working paper, 
13328. 
Schmitt Grohé, S., Uribe, M. (2004) “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices” 
Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 198 230. 
Senay, O. (1998), “The effects of goods and financial market integration on macroeconomic 
volatility”, The Manchester School Supplement, 39 61.   46 
Spange, M. (2007) “Do structural asymmetries increase the gains from international fiscal 
policy coordination?”, The Manchester school,75(1),131 150. 
Steffen, D. (2005) Fiscal policy under alternative exchange rate regimes: On the specification 
of money demand in new open economy macroeconomics, Inaugural Dissertation, 
University of Tübingen. 
Sutherland,  A.  (1996),  “Financial  market  integration  and  macroeconomic  volatility”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98(4), 521 39. 
Tille, C. (1999), The role of consumption substitutability in the international transmission of 
shocks, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, 67. 
Trionfetti,  F.  (2001),  “Public  procurement,  market  integration  and  income  inequalities.”, 
Review of International Economics, 9(1), 29 41. 
Warnock, F. (1998), “Idiosyncratic tastes in a two country optimizing model: Implications of 
standard presumption”, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System International 
Finance Discussion Papers, 631. 
Weil,  P.  (1989),  “Overlapping  families  of  infinitely  lived  agents”,  Journal  of  Public 


















2010–01  The Aggregation of Individual Distributive Preferences through the Distributive Liberal Social 
Contract : Normative Analysis  
  Jean MERCIER-YTHIER, janvier 2010. 
 
2010–02  Monnaie et Crise Bancaire dans une Petite Economie Ouverte 
  Jin CHENG, janvier 2010. 
 
2010–03  A Structural nonparametric reappraisal of the CO2 emissions-income relationships 
  Theophile AZOMAHOU, Micheline GOEDHUYS, Phu NGUYEN-VAN, janvier 2010. 
 
2010–04  The signaling role of policy action 
  Romain BAERISWYL, Camille CORNAND, février 2010. 
 
2010–05  Pro-development growth and international income mobility: evidence world-wide 
  Jalal EL OUARDIGHI, mars 2010. 
 
2010–06  The determinants of scientific research agenda: Why do academic inventors choose to 
perform patentable versus non-patentable research? 
  Caroline HUSSLER, Julien PENIN, mars 2010. 
 
2010–07  Adverse Selection, Emission Permits and Optimal Price Differentiation 
  Mourad AFIF, Sandrine SPAETER, mars 2010. 
 
2010–08  The impact of ambiguity on health prevention and insurance  
  Johanna ETNER, Sandrine SPAETER, mars 2010. 
 
2010–09  Equité du plaider coupable : une analyse économétrique dans trois tribunaux de grande 
instance français. 
  Lydie ANCELOT, mars 2010. 
 
2010–10  Networks, Irreversibility and Knowledge Creation. 
  Patrick LLERENA, Muge OZMAN, mars 2010. 
 
2010–11  Les clusters et les réseaux comme fondements de la dynamique d'innovation dans l'industrie 
biopharmaceutique 
  Marc Hubert DEPRET, Abelillah HAMDOUCH, avril 2010. 
 
2010–12  Large-scale risks and technological change: What about limited liability? 
  Julien JACOB, Sandrine SPAETER, avril 2010. 
 
2010–13  Innovation and Development. The Evidence from Innovation Surveys 
  Francesco BOGLIACINO, Giulio PERANI, Mario PIANTA, Stefano SUPINO, avril 2010. 
 
2010–14  Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods 
  Pierre DEHEZ, juin 2010. 
 
2010–15  Implications de l’imperfection des marchés financiers pour la politique monétaire 




2010–16  Bank lending networks, experience, reputation and borrowing costs. 
  Christophe J. GODLEWSKI, Bulat SANDITOV, Thierry BURGER-HELMCHEN, juin 2010. 
 
2010–17  Les déterminants individuels des absences au travail : une comparaison européenne. 
  Sabine CHAUPAIN-GUILLOT, Olivier GUILLOT, juin 2010. 
 
2010–18  Fiscal policy efficiency and coordination  : The New Open Economy Macroeconomics 
Approach. 

















La présente liste ne comprend que les Documents de Travail publiés à partir du 1
er janvier 2010. La liste 
complète peut être donnée sur demande. 
This list contains the Working Paper writen after January 2010, 1rst. The complet list is available upon 
request. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________ 